Fordham International Law Journal
Volume 40, Issue 3

2017

Article 9

Divergent Paths: Settlement In Us Litigation
And International Arbitration
Alexandre de Gramont∗

Michael D. Igyarto†

Tatiana Sainati‡

∗
†
‡

Copyright c 2017 by the authors. Fordham International Law Journal is produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press (bepress). http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ilj

DIVERGENT PATHS: SETTLEMENT IN US
LITIGATION AND INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION
By Alexandre de Gramont, Michael D. Igyarto, and Tatiana Sainati*

I.INTRODUCTION ...........................................................................953
II.THE PROMOTION OF SETTLEMENT IN AMERICAN
COURTS .................................................................................957
A. The Evolution of US Judicial Involvement in
Settlement of Disputes ......................................................957
B. ADR Techniques Used in US Courts .................................959
III.THE PROMOTION OF SETTLEMENT IN
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION.....................................964
IV.CONCLUSION.............................................................................972
I.

INTRODUCTION

There are many differences between international arbitration and
US litigation.1 One especially important, but often overlooked,
difference is the rate of settlement. Litigation cases in the state and
federal courts of the United States are very likely to end in settlement.
International arbitration cases are not. Such cases are far more likely
to proceed to trial (i.e., a full evidentiary hearing on the merits) than
are cases in US litigation.2
* Alexandre de Gramont is a partner in the International Arbitration Group at Dechert
LLP and an Adjunct Professor of Law at Georgetown University Law Center. Michael D.
Igyarto and Tatiana Sainati are associates in the International Arbitration Group of Dechert
LLP. Mr. de Gramont and Ms. Sainati are resident in Dechert’s Washington, D.C. office and
Mr. Igyarto is resident in Dechert’s New York office. The authors express their gratitude to
paralegal Madeline Tutman for her assistance in preparing this Article.
1. The term “US” litigation,” as used in this article, refers to litigation in both the state
and federal courts of the United States.
2. A separate reason why international arbitration cases tend to proceed to trial at a
higher rate than US litigation cases is that US litigation cases are more often resolved by
dispositive motions. Resolution of cases by dispositive motions in international arbitration
remains comparatively infrequent. See generally Adam Raviv, No More Excuses: Toward a
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The statistics, even if imperfect, are striking. Most analyses of
US cases put the settlement rate in the range of seventy to ninety
percent.3 Even when limited to contract/commercial cases, settlement
rates in US litigation are typically estimated at well over sixty
percent.4 International arbitration cases, on the other hand, settle at a
far lower rate, with most studies estimating the settlement rate at
thirty to forty percent.5
Cases in US litigation settle at a higher rate than cases in
international arbitration for a variety of reasons. Litigation in the state
and federal courts of the United States is notoriously expensive, timeconsuming, and disruptive, with far-reaching and intrusive discovery.
Moreover, the uneven quality of lay juries (and sometimes judges)
contributes to unpredictable results. Many litigants thus prefer to
settle their disputes rather than face the time, expense, and uncertainty
inherent in litigating a case through trial in US courts.
Another reason for the higher settlement rate in US litigation is
the fact that many US judges actively promote settlement. Many
judges no doubt promote settlement because they genuinely believe
that parties are usually better off resolving their disputes through
amicable resolution than protracted, costly, and unpredictable
litigation. But judges may also promote settlement as a means to
manage their increasingly large dockets, which in many judicial
Workable System of Dispositive Motions in International Arbitration, 28 ARB. INT’L 487
(2012).
3. Theodore Eisenberg & Charlotte Lanvers, What is the Settlement Rate and Why
Should We Care?, 6. J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 111, 112 (2009). Given the numerous
different court systems in the United States, and the fact that it is not always easy to determine
whether a case has settled through a review of the case file, there has been debate and
uncertainty concerning the settlement rate for US litigation. However, nearly all of the
analyses conclude that the vast majority of US litigation cases end in settlement. See id.
4. Id. at 120.
5. See, e.g., Yaraslau Kryvoi & Dmitry Davydenko, Consent Awards in International
Arbitration: From Settlement to Enforcement, 40 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 827, 828-29 (2015);
Loukas Mistelis, Special Section on the 2008 Survey on Corporate Attitudes Towards
Recognition and Enforcement of International Arbitral Awards: The Settlement-Enforcement
Dynamic in International Arbitration, 19 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 377, 378 (2008). As with
estimating the settlement rate in US litigation, estimating the settlement rate in international
arbitration presents certain challenges. There are numerous different international arbitration
institutions, which do not necessarily keep or make public records indicating settlement rates.
There are also numerous ad hoc arbitrations that are not administered by any institution.
Therefore, the analyses of settlement rates in international arbitration are generally based on
surveys of the users of international arbitration services rather than institutional records.
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districts have become overwhelming. Indeed, the culture of settlement
promotion in much of the US judiciary is so pervasive that
“settlement is the modal civil case outcome” in US litigation.6
By contrast, many international arbitrators are reluctant to
promote or even mention settlement, lest they be perceived as biased
or as prejudging the case.7 US and other common law lawyers who sit
as arbitrators in particular see their role as limited to adjudicating the
dispute.8 In their view, the promotion of settlement is a role limited to
mediators.9
Some commentators have observed that arbitrators who come
from legal traditions where part of the court’s mission is to seek
settlement (such as the Romano-Germanic tradition) are far more
open to discussing and even facilitating settlement in arbitration
cases.10 Yet despite the now prevalent efforts by US judges to
promote settlement, US lawyers who sit as arbitrators in international
arbitration remain largely reluctant or unwilling to intervene to
encourage settlement.11
The differences in settlement rates between US litigation and
international arbitration have real and practical consequences for
parties who have a choice of how to resolve their disputes; so too,
does the difference between how US judges and international
arbitrators approach the issue of settlement. There are certainly sound
reasons why users of international arbitration may not want arbitrators
to be as proactive (or, some might say, aggressive) as US judges in
6. Eisenberg & Lanvers, supra note 3, at 112.
7. Kun Fan, The Risks of Apparent Bias When an Arbitrator Acts as a Mediator:
Remarks on Hong Kong Court’s Decision in Gao Haiyan, 13 Y.B. PRIV. INT’L L. 535, 538
(2011).
8. See, e.g., Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, When Arbitrators Facilitate Settlement:
Towards a Transnational Standard, 25 ARB. INT’L 187, 190 (2009).
9. See Thomas J. Stipanowich & Zachary P. Ulrich, Commercial Arbitration and
Settlement: Empirical Insights into the Roles Arbitrators Play, 6 PENN. ST. Y.B. ARB.
MEDIATION 1, 1 (2014) (“It is generally understood that arbitrators adjudicate disputes and
mediators help settle them through negotiated agreement.”) (citing John W. Cooley,
Arbitration v. Mediation – Explaining the Differences, 69 JUDICATURE 263 (1986)).
10. Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler & Victor Bonnin, Arbitrators as Conciliators: A
Statistical Study of the Relationship between an Arbitrator’s Role and Legal Background,
18(2) INT’L CHAMBER COM. BULL. 1, 5-6 (2008), available at http://www.arbitrationicca.org/media/4/92368195274054/media01231914460597000950003.pdf.
11. Id. (“Practitioners know from experience that German arbitrators and arbitrators from
German-speaking Switzerland will be more likely to intervene to encourage a settlement than
their English or American counterparts.”).
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urging settlement. Arbitrators are paid to devote their attention to
adjudicating the dispute in a manner that results in a thorough and
reasoned outcome that is fair (if not necessarily favorable) to both
parties. One reason parties choose arbitration is to have greater
control over the proceedings, which in turn may lead many arbitrators
to take a “hands-off” approach when it comes to promoting
settlement. Many arbitrators may rightly believe that the parties,
having chosen arbitration, are perfectly capable of engaging in
settlement discussions without the arbitrator’s encouragement or
intervention.
On the other hand, as has been widely observed, many users of
international arbitration are concerned and dissatisfied with its rising
costs, increased delays, and perceived inefficiencies.12 The role of
arbitrators in promoting settlement is therefore “intertwined with
concerns regarding efficiency and economy in arbitration, which in
recent years has been the subject of continuing attention and
discussion.”13 If international arbitration is seen to be as costly and
time-consuming as litigation—with less likelihood of settlement
because arbitrators are unwilling to encourage it—that may well
result in fewer parties choosing international arbitration to resolve
their disputes.14 Many users of international arbitration may in fact
want arbitrators to play a role in encouraging the parties to settle.
This Article first reviews the rise in settlement efforts among US
judges over the past few decades and considers some of the methods
deployed by US judges to promote settlement.15 The Article then
considers why international arbitration cases tend to settle less often
than US litigation cases, including the reasons why many arbitrators
are reluctant to promote settlement. While recognizing the reasons
that arbitrators cannot become as proactive in promoting settlement as
many US judges, the Article suggests steps that arbitrators might take
to encourage settlement without departing from their obligation to
12. Kaufmann-Kohler, supra note 8, at 191.
13. Stipanowich & Ulrich, supra note 9, at 5.
14. Of course, some parties may not have any choice other than to agree to international
arbitration or face litigation in the foreign courts of their counterparty. But many parties are
able to negotiate forum resolution clauses in their cross-border contracts that provide for US
litigation and have no reason to be concerned about enforcing a US judgment against their
foreign counter-party.
15. See infra Section II.
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remain neutral and impartial, and to provide parties with the dispute
resolution services that they want.16 The Article concludes that while
it is neither feasible nor desirable for international arbitrators to
engage in settlement activities to the same extent as US judges, there
are steps that international arbitrators can and should take to promote
settlement in international arbitration cases.17
II. THE PROMOTION OF SETTLEMENT IN AMERICAN COURTS
The role of US judges in facilitating and promoting settlement
has received much attention over the past few decades.18 The use of
alternative dispute resolution (“ADR”) techniques currently employed
in US courts varies widely, even within the same courthouse. Prior to
1983, there was no explicit authority for US judges to participate in
settlement of their cases. Since then, Congress has enacted several
laws that explicitly authorize settlement participation by the judiciary.
Indeed, not only are US judges encouraged (and sometimes required)
to take a more active role in promoting settlement, there are
remarkably few limitations on their authority to do so. As a result, US
judges now employ a wide variety of ADR techniques, which the
courts have almost always approved when challenged. This section
will discuss first the current legislative framework regarding the
participation of US judges in settlement, and will then describe
several of the various techniques used in US courts to promote and
facilitate settlement.
A. The Evolution of US Judicial Involvement in Settlement of
Disputes
Common law courts, like those in the United States, have
traditionally “been entrusted with adjudicating, not settling,
disputes.”19 The original version of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
16. See infra Section III.
17. See infra Section IV.
18. Although our focus in this section is primarily on federal rules and practice, many
state courts throughout the United States have adopted similar rules and practices. “[E]very
state now has some type of court-connected ADR at some level.” Comparing State Courts,
NAT’L CTR. ST. CTS., http://www.ncsc.org/Information-and-Resources/Comparing-statecourts.aspx (last visited Jan. 11, 2017).
19. Kaufmann-Kohler, supra note 8, at 190.
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16, for example, “which provided that a court could hold a
discretionary pretrial conference, said nothing about settlement in its
list of subjects for consideration.”20
In the early 1980s, however, influential commentators like
Professor Judith Resnik “helped launch a debate in the United States
about judicial management and managerial judges that stemmed
primarily from frustrations over the costs, delays and formalism of
adjudication.”21 As a result, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16 was
amended in 1983 specifically to permit some judicial involvement in
the settlement process:
In any action, the court may in its discretion direct the attorneys
for the parties and any unrepresented parties to appear before it
for a conference or conferences before trial for such purposes as
. . . facilitating the settlement of the case.22

The Advisory Committee observed that the reasons for promoting and
facilitating settlement include saving costs for litigants and the
judicial system and reducing crowded court dockets:
[The 1983 amendment] recognizes that it has become
commonplace to discuss settlement at pretrial conferences. Since
it obviously eases crowded court dockets and results in savings to
the litigants and the judicial system, settlement should be
facilitated at as early a stage of the litigation as possible.23

In the 1990s, Congress continued its support for the expansion of
ADR in the federal judiciary through the passage of the Civil Justice
Reform Act, which “requires the courts to utilize ADR programs to
reduce litigation costs and to alleviate congestion and delay in the
court system.”24 As the late US District Judge Harold Baer, Jr.
observed, “[a] direct result of the [Civil Justice Reform Act] was the
adoption of some form of ADR in almost all of the ninety-four federal
district courts.”25 Then in 1998, Congress passed the Alternative

20. Edward Brunet, Judicial Mediation and Signaling, 3 NEV. L.J. 232, 242-43 (20022003).
21. Kaufmann-Kohler, supra note 8, at 191.
22. FED. R. CIV. P. 16(a)(5).
23. Id. (advisory committee’s note to 1983 amendments).
24. Harold Baer, Jr., History, Process, and a Role for Judges in Mediating Their Own
Cases, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 131, 133-34 (2001).
25. Id.
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Dispute Resolution Act,26 “which mandates that all federal courts
implement ADR programs, make improvements to existing programs,
and appoint judicial officers to supervise ADR procedures in the
courts.”27
B. ADR Techniques Used in US Courts
Despite the consistent encouragement for courts to develop and
utilize ADR techniques, there is little guidance regarding the
permissible extent of a judge’s involvement in settlement. The current
Model Code of Judicial Conduct contains only one provision
addressing the limits of a judge’s authority in settlement, which states
(in its entirety) that, “[a] judge may encourage parties to a proceeding
and their lawyers to settle matters in dispute but shall not act in a
manner that coerces any party into settlement.”28 However, as at least
one commentator has noted that the provision, “even as elaborated in
the comments to Rule 2.6(B), is so elastic and general that it leaves
individual judges free to conclude that any one of a number of
extremely different approaches to settlement work is ethically
permissible.”29
US courts currently deploy a myriad of ADR procedures to
promote settlement of disputes. Many of these procedures involve
persons other than the judge to help the parties reach settlement. As
described in one publication, the procedures include:
Mediation – “Mediation is a relatively informal, non-binding
process in which a neutral third party attempts to help litigants reach a
consensual solution to their dispute . . . . Because of its amorphous
and flexible nature, mediation is considered appropriate for most
types of civil cases.”30
Arbitration – “Arbitration differs from mediation in its use of an
arbitrator to reach a decision as opposed to a consensual judgment
among the parties . . . . Arbitration is typically useful in contract and
26. Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1988, 28 U.S.C. §§ 651-658 (1998).
27. Baer, supra note 24, at 134 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 651(b)-(d)).
28. MODEL CODE JUDICIAL CONDUCT, r. 2.6(B).
29. John C. Cratsley, Judges and Settlement: So Little Regulation with So Much at Stake,
16 DISP. RESOL. MAG. 4 (2010).
30. Peter Lantka, The Use of Alternative Dispute Resolution in the Federal Magistrate
Judge’s Office: A Glimmering Light Amidst the Haze of Federal Litigation, 36 UWLA L. REV.
71, 79 (2005) (internal citations omitted).
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tort cases involving moderate amounts of money for which litigation
costs are disproportionate to the amount at stake.”31
Hybrid Mediation-Arbitration (“Med-Arb”) – “Med-Arb is a
rarely utilized process in which parties first attempt to settle their case
through mediation and go directly to arbitration if the process is
unsuccessful . . . . however, [Med-Arb] is usually tempered by the
fact that litigants are tempted to hold back information during
mediation for fear that it will be used against them at a later date.”32
Early Neutral Evaluation (“ENE”) – “Early Neutral Evaluation
allows parties to present their preliminary case to a neutral evaluator.
The process involves an initial exchange of briefs followed by an
ENE session in which each party presents its case to the evaluator,
calling witnesses and presenting evidence if necessary. The session is
concluded with a non-binding written evaluation from the evaluator
assessing the merits of each party’s case and estimating possible
awards.”33
Summary Trial – “The summary trial, as its name implies, is a
truncated version of an actual trial. The process includes attorney
presentations to the judge, magistrate, or jury and an eventual nonbinding decision.”34
Mini-trial – Although rarely used, “[t]he mini-trial is a
specialized form of ADR designed to handle large, commercial
litigation cases. Generally, the mini-trial consists of high-level, highprofile executives meeting with a neutral third party. Unlike a
summary trial, the neutral party does not make a decision. Rather, the
‘trial’ consists of information being presented to the respective
executives who retire afterwards and attempt to reach a mutual
settlement.”35
Another report notes the use of a “practice jury,” where the
judge seeks volunteers from the jury pool (those in the courthouse for
jury duty that were not selected for an actual case) and then allows
counsel to make a presentation about the issues of the case and the

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id. at 79-80.
Id. at 80.
Id. at 80-81.
Id. at 81.
Id. at 82.
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evidence likely to be introduced. Once both sides have presented, the
attorneys can then ask questions of the practice jury.36
The extent to which US judges will themselves become involved
in an ADR procedure—and then remain to adjudicate the case if it
does not settle—varies considerably. Some judges, for example, will
not adjudicate a case on the merits if they have previously
participated in an unsuccessful form of ADR. Some judges routinely
have Magistrate Judges37 handle settlement conferences and ADR
processes to avoid any appearance of bias should the settlement
efforts fail. Other judges, however, will participate in the ADR
process and also adjudicate the dispute if settlement efforts fail.38
Beyond those differences, some judges will meet separately with the
parties (while others will only address all parties together), while
others will separate clients from attorneys for individual
discussions.39
Judge John C. Crastley served on the Massachusetts Superior
Court for nearly a quarter of a century and served as Chair of the
Superior Court Committee on Alternative Dispute Resolution. In an
illuminating article, Judge Crastley interviewed three of his
colleagues on the Massachusetts Superior Court “who are well known
for their work as settlement judges” and then recounted their various
approaches to settlement.40
As the article describes, “Judge A” routinely has an introductory
conference with all counsel and parties, and then asks everyone to
leave except for the defendant and the defendant’s counsel.41 Judge A
then asks the defense team how much money is available to settle.42
Judge A then meets with the plaintiff and the plaintiff’s counsel to ask

36. Cratsley, supra note 29, at 6.
37. 28 U.S.C. §§ 631(a) (2010) (providing authorization for US federal magistrate judges
as judicial officers in the district court system). A US magistrate judge exercises jurisdiction
over matters assigned by statute, as well as those delegated by the district judges, although
duties assigned to magistrate judges by district court judges may vary considerably from court
to court. Unlike District Court judges (who enjoy tenure for life), a full-time magistrate judge
is appointed by majority vote of the active district judges of the court and serves a term of
eight years. Id.
38. Cratsley, supra note 29, at 4-6.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 4.
41. Id. at 5.
42. Id.
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what amount they need to settle.43 Once he has a feeling for the
plaintiff’s position, Judge A asks only the plaintiff’s counsel whether
the case would settle if he could get a number near what he got from
the defense side, although counsel is directed not to share that number
with the plaintiff.44 Judge A then goes back to the defense side and
asks if they could settle for an amount higher than they initially
indicated if it would terminate the case.45 If the defense side agrees to
a higher (and usually final) number, he then meets privately with the
plaintiff’s counsel, instructs counsel that this is the best offer he can
get and asks counsel to recommend the number to the plaintiff and
explain how it was reached.46 Even if the plaintiff comes back with a
higher number, Judge A does not engage in further back-and-forth at
that point.47
“Judge B” takes a substantially different approach and never
separates the parties from either their counsel or the other parties.48
Instead, he inquires about the current state of settlement discussions
and offers or demands.49 He then comments on the realism of the
offers and demands, the prospects of the plaintiff prevailing and the
strengths of the pleaded defenses.50 If Judge B determines that the
lawyers are comfortable with achievable settlement terms but there is
a client hold-out, he then discusses with all parties the risks of trial,
the uncertainty of a jury decision, his views on the strength of
available evidence, and jury awards in similar trials.51
“Judge C” uses a more standard form of judicial mediation, in
which he meets with all parties and counsel, then engages in so-called
“shuttle diplomacy,” meeting with one side (and its counsel), then the
other side, trying to close the gap between the parties.52 Over the
course of several iterations, Judge C may suggest that the parties
“split the difference”; that the party with greater assets or exposure
should come up by more than half the difference; that the parties
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 5-6.
52. Id. at 6.
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agree to some form of non-monetary settlement; or that the parties
accept what Judge C believes to be the “best” possible settlement.53 If
Judge C is ultimately unsuccessful in resolving the case though, he
will then inform the parties that he will not be the trial judge.54
Some American courts even set up special systems to help
facilitate settlements. As retired US Magistrate Judge Morton Denlow
describes, some federal courts in Illinois have had their “Magistrate
Judges create[] and maintain a settlement database of cases that
appeared with frequency, such as employment discrimination, civil
rights, personal injury, and consumer credit.”55 Judge Denlow
explains:
By tracking the major characteristics of a settlement, including
the settlement terms, the plaintiff’s initial demand, the
defendant’s initial offer, the plaintiff’s itemization of damages,
the stage of the litigation, and brief comments from the judge, we
were able to help parties determine whether the settlement
proposals being made were consistent with other similar cases.
Because of the large volume of cases, we were able to provide
useful guidance to the parties on the appropriate settlement
range.56

The same court “also developed a settlement assistance program,
in which volunteer lawyers were appointed to represent pro se
litigants for the sole purpose of representing them in a settlement
conference.” Judge Denlow reports that the program “has further
reduced the amount of motions and trials in pro se cases.”57
Finally, some US judges use “signaling” as means to encourage
settlement. Signaling can occur orally (for example, commenting at a
pre-trial conference that a claim or defense may appear
unsubstantiated) or in writing while denying dispositive motions (e.g.,
“while I cannot say I think highly of plaintiff’s case, there may be
some issue of fact that precludes summary judgment”).58 Signaling

53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Morton Denlow, Magistrate Judges’ Important Role in Settling Cases, 2014 FED.
LAW. 101, 103 (2014).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 102.
58. Brunet, supra note 20, at 232-33.
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often encourages the parties (or at least one party) to consider
settlement seriously.59
III. THE PROMOTION OF SETTLEMENT IN INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION
There are good and legitimate reasons why the settlement rate in
international arbitration is lower than that in US litigation. As
explained above, parties to US litigation often decide to settle in order
to avoid the uncertainty of jury verdicts. That may be especially true
in complex or highly technical cases. By contrast, parties typically
choose international arbitrators who, by virtue of their background
and expertise, are particularly competent to decide the dispute at
hand. As also explained above, US judges often promote settlement as
a means to manage and reduce their heavy caseloads. By contrast,
parties (at least in theory) choose international arbitrators who can
dedicate themselves to the dispute presented without the competing
demands of a heavy court docket. In addition, parties to US litigation
may settle early to avoid having their confidential business
information (or other secrets) revealed in public proceedings. Because
parties can typically agree to maintain the confidentiality of
arbitration proceedings, such publicity concerns are less likely to lead
the parties to settle in international arbitration. In short, the reasons
why parties often prefer international arbitration to litigation also
explain, in part, why the settlement rate is lower in international
arbitration than in litigation. Overall, parties generally have more
confidence and fewer concerns in proceeding to a trial by arbitrators
than a trial by jury to resolve their dispute.
At the same time, the lower settlement rate in international
arbitration may also result from entrenched habits and antiquated
expectations—and perhaps even misconceptions as to what is
permissible on the part of the arbitrators. Again, given the oft-stated
concerns about increasingly expensive and protracted international
arbitration proceedings, there is every reason to consider whether
international arbitrators should become more active in promoting
settlement—and if so, how—within the parameters of their ethical
obligations and their mandate. Indeed, some commentators have
59. Id. at 250.
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questioned whether an arbitrator’s “ethical obligations extend to
helping promote an early resolution of a dispute by means of
settlement, which is very often the best way of achieving cost-savings
and efficiency as well as a satisfactory result.”60
There is no question that many parties to international
arbitration, as well as many international arbitral institutions, take
steps to promote the early settlement of disputes before undertaking
full-blown arbitration proceedings. For example, parties may include
tiered dispute resolution clauses in their contracts.61 Such clauses may
require that prior to commencing arbitration, a party must provide the
counterparty with a notice of the dispute. The parties must then
undertake efforts to resolve the dispute amicably (perhaps through a
meeting of their CEOs or other senior officers). If such efforts are
unsuccessful, the dispute resolution clause might then permit the
parties to proceed to arbitration—or might require another step such
as mediation. Often, these clauses require the parties to devote a
certain amount of time to such efforts before formally commencing
the arbitration.62
Similarly, many prominent arbitral institutions provide ADR
services designed to assist the parties in settling their disputes without
arbitration—such as mediation and expert determinations.63 The
Singapore International Arbitration Centre (“SIAC”) launched an
“Arb-Med-Arb” protocol in 2015 in collaboration with the recently

60. Stipanowich & Ulrich, supra note 9, at 2.
61. See, e.g., PAUL D. FRIEDLAND, ARBITRATION CLAUSES FOR INTERNATIONAL
CONTRACTS 121 (2d ed. 2007).
62. See id. at 121-23.
63. For example, the ICC administers both arbitrations and mediations. The institution’s
Mediation Rules and Arbitration Rules are “designed to facilitate the combination of ICC
Mediation and ICC Arbitration.” Combination of Arbitration and Mediation Under the ICC
Rules of Arbitration and ICC Rules of Mediation, INT’L CHAMBER COM.,
http://www.iccwbo.org/Products-and-Services/Arbitration-and-ADR/Mediation/Introduction/
Combination-of-arbitration-and-mediation-under-the-ICC-Rules-of-Arbitration-and-ICC-Rules
-of-Mediation/ (last visited Jan. 11, 2017). Similarly, the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce
offers both arbitration and mediation services. Dispute Resolution Services, ARB. INST.
STOCKHOLM CHAMBER COM., http://sccinstitute.com/dispute-resolution/ (last visited Jan. 11,
2017). The International Institute for Conflict Prevention and Resolution likewise offers
mediation and arbitration services. Services Offered, INT’L INST. CONFLICT PREVENTION &
RESOL., https://www.cpradr.org/dispute-resolution-services/services-offered (last visited Jan.
11, 2017).
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established Singapore International Mediation Centre.64 If the parties
elect to participate in the protocol, then, after the exchange of the
Notice of Arbitration and Response to the Notice of Arbitration, the
SIAC tribunal refers the dispute to the Mediation Centre and stays
arbitral proceedings while mediation is attempted. If, within eight
weeks, mediation proves unsuccessful, arbitral proceedings resume.65
The harder issue is whether and to what extent international
arbitrators themselves should promote settlement discussions among
the parties appearing before them. Arbitration rules and institutions
provide that arbitrators can at least raise the issue of settlement with
the parties. For example, the United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law (“UNCITRAL”) Notes on Organizing
Arbitral Proceedings of 2016 provide that “[i]n appropriate
circumstances, the arbitral tribunal may raise the possibility of a
settlement between the parties.”66
In addition, there are a number of steps that arbitrators might
take to promote settlement that do not include directly engaging in
settlement discussions with the parties. For example, Neil Kaplan, a
well-known arbitrator and former High Court Judge in Hong Kong,
has proposed a mechanism—the eponymous Kaplan Opening—that
uses the inherent flexibility in arbitral proceedings to clarify key
issues and facts in dispute before the main hearing.67 Mr. Kaplan
64. Gary B. Born, Drafting International Arbitration Agreements, in INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION AND FORUM SELECTION AGREEMENTS: DRAFTING AND ENFORCING 29-114, ¶
24 (5th ed. 2016).
65. SIAC-SIMC Arb-Med-Arb Protocol, SINGAPORE INT’L MEDIATION CTR.,
http://simc.com.sg/siac-simc-arb-med-arb-protocol (last visited Jan. 11, 2017).
66. UNCITRAL, UNCITRAL NOTES ON ORGANIZING ARBITRAL PROCEEDINGS ¶ 72
(2016), available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/arb-notes/arb-notes2016-e.pdf. This provision reflects a changed attitude in favor of settlement. The 1996 Notes
recommended that tribunals “only suggest settlement negotiations with caution.” UNCITRAL,
UNCITRAL NOTES ON ARBITRAL PROCEEDINGS ¶ 46 (1996), available at
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/arb-notes/arb-notes-e.pdf. The Working
Group’s decision to adopt a more favorable stance on settlement “reflect[s] more positively the
possibility of amicable settlements during arbitral proceedings.” Esme Shirlow, UNCITRAL’s
2016 Notes on Organizing Arbitral Proceedings: Evolutions and Fragmentations in
ARB.
BLOG
(Sept.
7,
2016),
International
Arbitration,
KLUWER
http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/2016/09/07/uncitrals-2016-notes-on-organizing-arbitralproceedings-evolutions-and-fragmentations-in-international-arbitration/.
Perspectives
on
settlement “had evolved to such an extent that—in some circumstances—it may even be
appropriate for arbitrators to be involved in mediating such settlements themselves.” Id.
67. Neil Kaplan, If It Ain’t Broke, Don’t Change It, 80 ARB. 172, 172 (2014).
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invites tribunals to fix a hearing after the first round of written
submissions and before the hearing on the merits at which both
counsel open their respective cases before the tribunal.68 One
advantage of this Kaplan Opening is that by “[b]ringing the parties
together, with their trial counsel, well in advance of the hearing . . .
there is a chance that at least part of the case may be settled, or points
of disagreement minimized.”69
Arbitrators have other tools to focus the parties on reasons for
settling, including weaknesses or vulnerabilities of their case. Article
2 of the IBA Rules on the Taking of Evidence in International
Arbitration provides that the tribunal “is encouraged to identify to the
Parties, as soon as it considers it to be appropriate, any issues: (a) that the
Arbitral Tribunal may regard as relevant to the case and material to its
outcome; and/or (b) for which a preliminary determination may be
appropriate.”70 The American Arbitration Association’s Code of Ethics

for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes clarifies that arbitrators “may
engage in discourse with the parties or their counsel, draw out
arguments or contentions, comment on the law or evidence, make
interim rulings, and otherwise control or direct the arbitration.”71
Together with institutional rules designed to help identify key issues
early in the proceedings,72 these provisions ensure that arbitrators can
discuss the case with the parties. In so doing, the Tribunal can work to
ensure “the mutual recognition of each party’s position,” and to
facilitate “new analysis and new risk assessment by each party, which
may well be the beginning of new efforts to have the case settled.”73
But should arbitrators go further? Should they become involved
in facilitating or even participating in settlement discussions, as many
US judges do? Hybrid procedures—such as Med-Arb, in which
68. Id. at 174.
69. Id.
70. IBA RULES ON THE TAKING OF EVIDENCE IN INT’L ARB. art. 2(3) (INT’L BAR ASS’N
2010).
71. CODE OF ETHICS FOR ARBITRATORS IN COMMERCIAL DISPUTES 4 (AM.
ARBITRATION
ASS’N
&
AM.
BAR
ASS’N
2004),
available
at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/dispute/commercial_disputes.authchec
kdam.pdf (quoting Canon I to Rule 15).
72. For example, the 2010 revision of the UNCITRAL rules was intended to ensure
clarification of the core issues in dispute at an earlier stage in the proceedings. DAVID CARON
& LEE CAPLAN, THE UNCITRAL ARBITRATION RULES, A COMMENTARY 371 (2d ed. 2013).
73. Hilmar Raeschke-Kessler, The Arbitrator as Settlement Facilitator, 21 ARB. INT’L
523, 531 (2005).
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parties commence mediation with the understanding that, if the
procedure fails, the dispute will go to arbitration, and arbitrationmediation (“Arb-Med”), in which parties begin arbitral proceedings
and then elect to attempt mediation—both anticipate the same person
acting as both arbitrator and mediator.74 This dual role raises concerns
about the ability of the arbitrator-mediator to remain impartial
throughout the processes.75 The bias problem arises because “the role
of mediator and arbitrator can be at odds with each other.”76 The
mediator can, and must, caucus with the parties separately, creating
the risk of bias if the mediator learns confidential information in the
course of these ex-parte conversations77 or expresses provisional
perspectives on the case.78 The ICC Mediation Rules address this
concern, stating that “[u]nless all of the parties agree otherwise in
writing, a Mediator shall not act nor shall have acted in any judicial,
arbitral or similar proceedings relating to the dispute.”79
Despite the advent of such procedures, many arbitrators remain
reluctant to actively engage in settlement proceedings. As discussed
above, the issue is sometimes one of culture. As Professor Gabrielle
Kaufmann-Kohler writes, arbitrators from legal cultures where courts
play a prominent role in promoting settlement—such as Germany,
Switzerland, and China—tend to engage in settling disputes among
the parties before them.80 Yet, as also noted above, US (and other
common law) lawyers who serve as arbitrators rarely promote
settlement among the parties appearing before them, notwithstanding
the increased role played by US courts in doing precisely that over the
past three decades.81

74. Jacob Rosoff, Hybrid Efficiency in Arbitration: Waiving Potential Conflicts for Dual
Role Arbitrators in Med-Arb and Arb-Med Proceedings, 26 J. INT’L ARB. 89, 89 (2009).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 89-90.
77. Id. at 91.
78. Alexis Mourre, The Proper Use of Med-Arb in the Resolution of International
Disputes, 2016 ASIAN DISP. REV. 94, 94 (2016).
79. MEDIATION RULES art. 10(3) (INT’L CHAMBER COM. 2014).
80. See Kaufmann-Kohler, supra note 8, at 195-97. See generally Kaufman-Kohler
Bonnin, supra note 10.
81. W. Whitaker Rayner, Judicial Authority in the Settlement of Federal Civil Cases, 42
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 171, 172 (1985); see also Klaus Peter Berger, The International
Arbitrator’s Dilemma: Transnational Procedure versus Home Jurisdiction—A German
Perspective, 25 ARB. INT’L 217, 225 (2009) (“[C]ommon law arbitrators and counsel have
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More broadly, proactive efforts by international arbitrators to
facilitate settlement remain exceptional.82 That is unfortunate, as there
are significant advantages to having the arbitrator involved in
settlement discussions with the parties, as opposed to a mediator or
other third person who is not involved in adjudicating the dispute.
According to Professor Kaufmann-Kohler:
First, the arbitrator already knows the case. A third party
mediator or conciliator who acts before or in parallel to
arbitration must acquire such knowledge, with the unavoidable
duplication of work, additional expenses and delays. Second and
foremost, the arbitrator is the master of the timing the
proceedings, and is in the best position to choose the appropriate
moment to offer the tribunal’s services for settlement purposes.
This may often be after the exchange of written briefs and before
the hearing. It may also be after a partial award. It should not be
too early in the proceedings, when the arbitrators (and sometimes
the parties as well) do not have a sufficient understanding of the
issues. It should not be too late either; it should not be at a time
when the parties have already spent too much time on the
arbitration and may no longer be willing to settle. Identifying the
right moment is a question of judgment, and experienced
arbitrators will generally know when the time is ripe.83

There are also significant risks or concerns when an arbitrator
becomes involved in promoting settlement. The first is the risk posed
to the consensual nature of arbitration. Neither party should feel
coerced into settling the case or even into entering settlement
discussions (with or without the arbitrator). Another risk is that a
party may reveal facts to the arbitrator-mediator that are unknown to
the other party during private caucuses, raising due process
concerns.84 Still another risk is the threat to impartiality. The fear is
that, if the settlement fails and the arbitration continues, the arbitrator

always looked with skepticism and even some dismay at this pragmatic approach to settlement
in arbitration.”).
82. Karl-Heinz Böckstiegel, Arbitrator’s Case Management: Experiences and
Suggestions, in GLOBAL REFLECTIONS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW, COMMERCE, AND DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT—LIBER AMICORUM IN HONOUR OF ROBERT BRINER 115, 124 (Gerald Aksen &
Robert Briner eds., 2005).
83. Kaufman-Kohler, supra note 8, at 197.
84. Id.
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will lose her impartiality and/or objectivity because of information
learned during the course of settlement discussions.85
There are rules and guidelines to help diminish, if not eliminate,
these valid concerns. First, an arbitrator may only get involved in
settlement discussions with the informed consent and express
agreement of the parties. General Standard 4(d) of the IBA Guidelines
on Conflict of Interest in International Arbitration provides:
An arbitrator may assist the parties in reaching a settlement of the
dispute . . . at any stage of the proceedings. However, before
doing so, the arbitrator should receive an express agreement by
the parties that acting in such a manner shall not disqualify the
arbitrator from continuing to serve as arbitrator. Such express
agreement shall be considered to be an effective waiver of any
conflict of interest that may arise from the arbitrator’s
participation in such process or from information that the
arbitrator may learn in the process. If the assistance by the
arbitrator does not lead to final settlement of the case, the parties
remain bound by their waiver.86

Second, arbitrators are discouraged from meeting with the parties
separately. The IBA Rules of Ethics for International Arbitrators
provide that arbitrators may make settlement proposals “to both
parties simultaneously, preferably in the presence of each other.”87
The IBA Rules state that it is “undesirable that any arbitrator discuss
settlement terms with a party in the absence of the other,” since this
could result in the disqualification of the arbitrator.88 Third, although
the IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest make clear that an
arbitrator’s impartiality does not necessarily become impaired if she
engages in settlement discussions with the parties, the arbitrator

85. Id.
86. IBA GUIDELINES ON CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN INT’L ARB. § 4(d) (INT’L BAR
ASS’N 2014).
87. IBA RULES OF ETHICS FOR INT’L ARBITRATORS § 8 (INT’L BAR ASS’N 1987); see
also Kaufman-Kohler, supra note 8, at 199.
88. IBA RULES OF ETHICS FOR INT’L ARBITRATORS, supra note 87, § 8. The concept of
Med-Arb and Arb-Med, where the arbitrator also plays the role of mediator, may run into
conflict with this Rule, given that mediators typically meet with the parties separately. See
Rosoff, supra note 74, at 91.

2017]

SETTLEMENT IN US LITIG. & INT’L ARB.

971

should nonetheless resign if she considers that she cannot perform her
duties as a result of her involvement in the settlement process.89
The London-based Centre for Efficient Dispute Resolution
(“CEDR”) launched its Rules for the Facilitation of Settlement in
International Arbitration in 2009. In adopting these rules, parties
agree that the arbitral tribunal’s facilitation of settlement will not be
used as grounds to disqualify the tribunal or any member thereof, or
to challenge any award rendered.90 The tribunal is prohibited from
taking into account “any substantive matters discussed in settlement
meetings or communications” or assessing the credibility of any
witness based on the witness’ participation in settlement discussions
when rendering an award.91 The tribunal is likewise prevented from
ex parte meetings, or from acquiring information from one party
which is not shared with the other.92 To facilitate settlement, the
tribunal is vested with the authority to provide the parties with
“preliminary views on the issues in dispute,” as well as “preliminary
non-binding findings.”93 The tribunal “shall insert a Mediation
Window in the arbitral proceedings when requested to do so by all
Parties,” and must also “adjourn the arbitral proceedings for a
specified period of time so as to enable mediation.”94
In sum, in appropriate cases, arbitrators can and should
encourage and facilitate settlement as an important tool in making
international arbitration less expensive and more efficient. Arbitral
institutions increasingly recognize the need to promote settlement in
international arbitration. With the consent of the parties, arbitrators
also have a role to play in promoting and facilitating settlement, but
must be mindful of valid due process and impartiality concerns in
playing this part. The task may not be easy, as arbitrators who have
been involved in the parties’ settlement discussions should not take
the matters discussed in settlement meetings or other communications
into account if the case proceeds to the merits. But many US judges
89. See generally IBA GUIDELINES ON CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN INT’L ARB., supra
note 86.
90. CEDR RULES FOR THE FACILITATION OF SETTLEMENT IN INT'L ARB. art. 3(3) (CTR.
EFFECTIVE DISP. RESOL. 2009).
91. Id. art. 3(5).
92. Id. art. 5(2).
93. Id. art. 5(1).
94. Id. art. 5(3).
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are able to accomplish this task. Moreover, arbitrators must often put
aside evidence and other information they have heard, but which they
later determine to be irrelevant, in deciding the merits of a case. By
following appropriate steps, such as ensuring the written agreement of
parties and avoiding ex parte communications, arbitrators can fairly
promote settlement and help improve the efficiency and efficacy so
vital to international arbitration.
IV. CONCLUSION
Despite a growing awareness that promoting settlement may
help reduce costs and inefficiencies in international arbitral
proceedings, arbitrations settle at much lower rates than proceedings
in US courts. In part, this disparity may be attributed to the assertive
case management approach embraced by US judges, who actively
encourage settlement as a mechanism to address ever-growing
dockets. In contrast, many arbitrators remain timid about promoting
settlement—and are unlikely to be involved in settlement or
mediation efforts. Such reluctance stems, in part, from fears that
participation in settlement risks the arbitrator’s neutrality or raises due
process concerns. But these concerns can be addressed by following
guidelines and rules designed to preserve arbitral neutrality and
procedural fairness while helping parties reach an amicable
settlement. With the consent of the parties, arbitrators should use
these tools in order to achieve fair, efficient, and cost-effective
resolution of disputes. There are good and understandable reasons
why the settlement rate in international arbitration is and will almost
certainly remain lower than that of US litigation. But the notion that
international arbitrators should never promote or involve themselves
in settlement discussions among the parties is neither sound nor
sustainable.

